that its marks not be redundant.2 Whether the self i manteau word which covers modes of distinction based on the lure (leurre) of an impossible identity of the speaking subject or whether it is a monadic reduction of the context in which the beginning and the end of first-person discourse coalesce to keep the subject from being alienated from a past for which he seeks to assume responsibility-in either case, the study of a literature of self mandates a reactivation of the search for an origin, for a reference which would not only precede all judgments but would also antedate all previous guarantees for past judgments. Thus Philippe Lejeune in his book Le Pacte autobiographique, after stating that autobiography "is in all cases a narrative in retrospect made by a real person about her past," goes on to suggest the need for a typology of four different classes (form/theme/reliability/ point of view), the basis of which is a single reference to the "real" person as warranted by the autobiographical pact, i.e., the belief that an autobiographer is always perforce honest with his reader, even if what he says is almost always less than the truth.3 For Lejeune, this autobiographical pact is a contract, not between the impersonating subject and his various personas but between the narrator supposedly talking about himself as if he were another person and the reader having accepted the possibility of the experiment. The point has been refined by Antoine Compagnon in his recent book La Seconde Main (a historical and semiotic study of quotation), where the definition of an emblematic model for Montaigne's Essais affords the insight that the model is not static but mobile and thus continuously able to produce the displacement which allowed the production of the model in the first place.4 The advantage of Compagnon over Lejeune is that the picture of an origin, instead of being fixed, reflects the homnothetical process required of anyone looking for his own beginning. In this case, the process of Compagnon looking over Montaigne's shoulder, who is in turn looking over Plutarch's shoulder, tends in effect to make the whole metacritical enterprise of defining quotation an image, a reflection of the autobiographical process itself.
There lies another, if not the ultimate, redundancy. Aiming at himself as if he were another, the subject "shoots for" an objective self, even though that object is only an illusion coextensive with the act of shooting. To paraphrase Heraclitus, life and death and nothingness are only one; or rather, the moment of maximum tension associated with a on the bow of life, holds the secret of life.5 Focusing critical theory and autobiography so relevant to one a current vogue of autobiographical criticism so clear, Staro menting on one of Rousseau's classic autobiographical gests that the task of the critic is essentially to weave a p which, in effect, the end of the investigation may app beginning of the text he has been reading (pp. 154-69 mean more than the mitamorphose du cercle with which Geneva School have tried to integrate literature and critic of existential awareness. It is no longer a process thro critic's consciousness "re-creates" the work. It is the r of the way in which the work under study becomes a planation-on the model of Oedipus Rex read by Freud him in his elaboration of the Oedipal conflict, or the l used by Levi-Strauss to reflect the writing of his own Tr
Contextualized in time and space (the England of Pepy the France, Switzerland, and Italy of Rousseau; the B Strauss), autobiography reflects only itself. It is an act w ing, the yp"EOEV on either side of the life, the /plo3 it en the life and death, the presence and absence which it s gives us as through a mirror: an image. The proper a then, aims at the re-creation of a primal mirror-stage perience of recognition (the narrator recognizes his recognizes what the narrator is talking about) subsum content of reality. As a matter of fact, the next chapter La Relation critique is titled "L'empire de l'imaginaire unreality of the imaginary object is constantly balanc quite controlled, by a conscious choice of the critical cons 173-254) .6
Autobiography then is not concerned with the estab truly selfish reality in the eyes of an impartial, autonom in "autobiographies" where the narrator claims to be d the author and tells the story of another person (The of Alice B. Toklas is a perfect example). Nor can the biography be concerned with the truth or the value of th though autobiography were but one of the cardinal genre telian stock of mimetic objects-a genre which, inciden really come into being before the end of the eighteent 5 "For the bow the name is life, but the work is death," in H Cosmic Fragments, ed. G. S. Kirk (Cambridge, 1954), p. 116. 6 Starobinski picks up Lacan's distinction between the imagin is a conscious construction of the subject) and the symbolic (that responsible for this construction and which is elegantly suggested even then never ceased to appear apologetic, as is clear and mode of confessions from Augustine to Rouss Wilde's Portrait of Dorian Gray and Gide's Cahiers
In this sense, Northrop Frye's classification of autobio genre of romance, while serving the overall pattern remarkably well, also does the greatest possible diss biographic enterprise by making it lose its specificity literature. As if it were but a minor accident, Frye a confession is "made up of essays in which only the c tive of the longer form is missing."'7 But, as we h everything else is missing in autobiography. Autobi model-building activity: it has nothing to reveal, it discourse containing the discursive subject which co of discussion, albeit a subject who conceals his differen and specificity under the mask of Everyman. Thus Sartrean autobiography, which runs the gamut of all t nouns (from "they" to "I" and back again), is approp Traitor. In a world of others, the subject who claim a liar. Perhaps it is this defect in the autobiographi explains the inevitability of the confessional traditi Augustine and Rousseau. Yet it is a structural defect. A puts it: "He turns back, he rereads his words, he re Take any event, pursue your sense of it as far as you c be like pulling one thread in a tangled skein."s In the Discourse on Method the cogito is made possib process leading to the ultimate logical distinction b cartes thought it unnecessary to proceed. I suggest autobiography ever formalizes its methodology in the of the Discourse on Method, the autobiographer's searc tory image to produce, through an experience de pense which, in turn, guarantees the viability of his enterpr Cartesian experience of doubt. It is as though the w consciousness, alternatively dominating its object and b by it, were too fragile for words: "It occurs to me that duction of the mind's birth obtainable is the stab of wo panies the precise moment when, gazing at a tangle of one suddenly realizes that what had seemed a natur that tangle is a marvelously disguised insect or bird."9 7Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, N.J., 195 8 The Traitor, trans. Richard Howard (New York, 1959) , p 9 Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory: An Autobiography R (New York, 1966) , p. 298; hereafter cited in the text.
to the Cartesian doubt than discovering that one's ow actually the necessary condition for establishing the auth existence. First, it could be argued that what is guarantee ing process is not the sum total of doubtful experien history of the doubter. Second, it could also be argue established by the Method is less the moment of rec everything becomes certain than the full development o process. Here we are reminded of Kant's critique of cogito, according to which it is foolish in the search for to use a reference to God, whose condition for existence part of the proof itself.10 But the main point of the Ka leading to the model of an "empty" cogito without any po from the sensible world into the intelligible, is that it s cartes's emphasis on the moment after the doubt, the certainty into a certainty founding the method and allow is only a fiction based on the idea that the uncertain oth the doubting process is really the same as the person cartes's Discourse, as in most autobiographies, there is a moment of actualization of a writing persona to the ficti self delivered through the autobiographical process. Man autobiographers are guilty of this shift into what shoul fiction of self-writing (the idea that the other produced process is the same person as the "I" who was writing). T ever, is an inescapable one. Thus the Nabokov who so d the pattern of identity and difference in the episode of branch falls prey to the illusion that he has indeed fo and the promise of a definite coherence for his ongoing Although he must admit this is but an illusion ("Sixty to glittering frost-dust between my fingers," p. 100), ult "crumbling" which mandates his whole search. Like philosopher who doubts, the Nabokovian autobiogra doubt, the uncertainty before he can master his fiction: mingles with that of the leaf shadows" (p. 171). Peop and things appear in the "tremulous prism" of his me more inclined to preserve this tremulousness of the experience than to establish the historical facts it con is not searched out. It is, rather, carefully selected-the c may be likened to breathing-and poetically fixed.""' lo Immanuel Kant, "Transcendental Dialectic," Ch. iii, Sec. 4, Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1951) .
11 Andrew Field, Nabokov: His Life in Part: A Critical Narr 1967), p. 34; quoted in Elizabeth Bruss, Autobiographical Ac Situation of a Literary Genre (Baltimore, Md., and London, 1 Like Heraclitus' reader caught between life and of the bow, of consciousness and desire-and who to certify to him that the difference between two entities is based on a phonological distinction of biographer needs to experience the tension of hi one moment what is fixed, albeit breathing. It is this tension and tremulousness that the object can or to take poetically in its etymological sense, appe its appearing and still convince us of the truth of i fixation is short-lived, however. With the carefu Nabokov's distinction between the bird and the branch soon becomes the epistemological model for an investigation in which, through further distinctions of interpretive content, decisions about the articulation of autobiographical data, the qualitative time of all experience is turned into a chronology of historical sequences: "I soon became aware that if my views, the not unusual views of Russian democrats abroad, were received with pained surprise or polite sneers by English democrats in situ, another group, the English ultraconservatives, rallied eagerly to my side but did so from such crude reactionary motivation that I was only embarrassed by their despicable support" (Nabokov, p. 264). It is as though the vagaries of the doubter have now been corrected by rules of method: "I offer this work only as a history, or, if you like, a fable, in which there may perhaps be found, besides some examples that may be imitated, many others that it will be well not to follow."14 The moment is fixed, albeit no longer poetically. The doubting subject, who remains the model for the autodiegetic "I" in the autobiographical process, has become a narrative subject and his narrative has turned into, or rather been reduced to, a deductive model of fictional plot.15 With autobiography, however, the distinction between the object and its shadow, between a subject and its image, remains imperfect. As Starobinski himself is ready to admit, autobiography is also the mode of incompleteness (pp. 119-21 Paris, 1972) . Genette uses the term didgetique to refer to the "spatio-temporal universe designated by the narrative." Autodidgetique (p. 253) refers to a variety of narratives where the narrator is not the hero of his own narrative (e.g., Ishmael in Moby Dick) but rather a witness, a spectator.
indeed degrees of autobiographical truth on the A mimesis, and that these degrees are determined by t tions and expectations, is extremely problematic.1 following up on linguistic postulates to establish a conduct for the autobiographer, according to the kin in mind and the commitments he intends to live up to difficult. Thus a speech-act theory of autobiography a lish degrees of commitment in autobiographical disco the linguistic area of autobiography remains that statement which can only be understood in the conte by the locutor and thus does not and should not i reader, the interlocutor, except as yet another ima rapher himself.17 In autobiography, however, in c the rest of literature, the locutionary act is not perc speech act. It is, first of all, an attempt to suggest a s thing which could be captured by phrases like "I happy"-while the pertinence of statements expres rendered problematic by the lack of identity of t them: what he felt then he no longer feels now, and he did not feel then. Neither constative (autobiograph with facts) nor performative (it does not achieve the time it is describing it, but rather uses it as an e graphical discourse is simply a mimesis, a pretense of illocutionary dimension is partial because writer a lapsed into one. This collapsing of the dual subject the past and vice versa) into a narrative monad is, in because the "I" having no substance outside a set o tions is a floating deictic.19 It is problematic, and 16 Roy Pascal, Design and Truth in Autobiography (Cam 17 The distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and ments is a constant of speech-act theory as expounded by (How to Do Things with Words, New York, 1965) and (Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, locutionary acts are carried out simply by uttering a certain tain sense and reference and perlocutionary acts make it the utterance apart from its consequences (e.g., it is convinc leading), illocutionary acts have a certain conventional force ordering). In other words, the illocutionary acts take effe standing of the meaning and of the force of the locution. As performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing For a study of autobiography from a speech-act perspectiv graphical Acts.
18 For the distinction between constative and performative 19 Deictics are morphemes whose meaning can only be det to the speaker (s). Thus first-and second-person pronouns the speaking subject and to the person to whom this subje the term deictic refers to all other parts of speech whose mostly in conflictual episodes where the narrator att his own image from the conglomeration of pres comings and goings of others. Several of those imag next to one another by the narrator soon approxim think of as a plot. But they remain images, traces o reality. In autobiographical discourse, there is no st "I am myself the matter of my book." Even if t would only be a miniature story, a scale model. I the plot while what we seek is the thought. We something like Cardinal Newman's "autobiograph writing his Roland Barthes sprinkles his book w function it is to work up a chronology of sorts, wh to weave a chimera of lexical entries. The impli reader is at leisure to associate Barthes's charact any of the entries, and Barthes the critic, even i bases and be everything to everyone (as he attempt ing his own book for a Parisian magazine), is incapa of making proper sense of causal relations in a line the writer had renounced his privilege to defin this topical disarray goes back to Montaigne, an Barthes picks up an old French tradition of rhet the important point here is less the French char than the attempt to destroy the notion of linearity action between subject and object.
Autobiography is the domain of the intransitive. seeks to capture something other than a mere ch The reason may be the extreme complication of in attempting any kind of chronology. As Goeth Truth, "As I endeavored to describe in right order the external influences, the stages through which t had borne me, I was thrown out of my narrow pri world."22 But more to the point: the image, the Nab the autobiographer seeks to retrieve from a world on th born and yet ready to dissolve), the tremulousness with sees the story of his own life anew, are more symptoma to see himself in the act-to be his own voyeur-than the historian's or the novelist's mode, true narrativ autobiographer is attracted by the mirage of his own of himself gazing at a spectacle in which, as the hero of adventure, he not only seeks to go through all the act carrying out but also attempts to isolate them, to fix moment of their recollection, and to withdraw them fr ion of memory signs. To use Michel Leiris's words, the a seeks those moments when he can feel tangential to t himself.23 They are brief, even incidental. But in the contingency, they acquire an extraordinary value. Wh not a segment of the life of "X" or "Y" but rather "X at his or her life as if it were a relief delineated in space, It is remarkable that such diverse works as Roussea Wordsworth'sPrelude, Leiris'sL'Age d'homme, Benjam Reflections, and T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets display th pation for the particular, the contingent. More remar is the compulsion of all these writers to appeal to the their discourse, they all strive for the spectator's place, tacle is invisible:
Sudden in a shaft of sunlight Even while the dust moves There rises the hidden laughter Of children in the foliage.24
To Freudian and especially Lacanian critics, this triangular scheme of vision is only a remake of the triadic model controlling the Oedipal interdict. It is impossible simply to be oneself, or as Mehlman says, "to be present to the condition of one's being in the realm of speech and desire,"25 because that would entail for the Narcissistic subject the end of his reflecting process-or to put it another way, his self-inflicted violation and death. Mehlman suggests that to bypass this prohibition the subject then resorts to poetic illusion, to textual drifting. By simply looking at how it was, or rather at how it might have bee impunity fulfill his desire and by the sheer magic of me for the reality of time past a scene, a tableau, where im nitely repeatable acts are no longer those of a subject up rather the scheme of a voyeur constantly reenacting scenario. His is a vignette where he is now defined by w clear as a picture, even a still life, he now feels free. to be responsible for what he knows. The most famous e is Marcel looking at himself spying on Albertine an Vinteuil performing their sadistic ritual prior to interc jouvain and much later again trying to discuss the episo tine.26 The place, the locus of the voyeur, is the one wh mediates pleasure through the sheer witnessing of th Marcel the narrator has now become master and gomade the scene his very own, without the abandon whic so vulnerable in the past. Now he knows better. Not o ceed in cleansing Mr. Vinteuil's memory of any affront, to free himself from the alienation inherent in his bein scene he had not understood and whose understanding pain-because he can no longer alter the past-but he has somehow come to grips with it.
Here then is the crux of autobiography. The autobio ble of coinciding with the subject in the past can only a which allows him to see himself in the past as in a paint power to alter the past he is restricted to seeing himself deriving his feelings not from the performance of the representation of that performance. He is a viewing himself performing an act at a certain time in the past, completing it because the narrative of memory has prod a still life in which, much like Marcel before the magic the slides of Golo, the narrator longs to be a voyeu subject of an action never quite his own, though of eter him.27 Yet for all its illusions, its displacements, autobio profound synthetic knowledge. Nowhere else in hum except through the very operation of communicating th ory to oneself and to others, is it possible to find anothe interpenetration of past and present. The vision affo biographer is both fragmentary and complete. On the one segments momentarily cut off from the chronological s subsumes them and whose succession they now dela hand, these segments now constitute scenes which have the power not only to delay the rest of the narr the past, the present, even the future of the narr himself, the narrator can gain an understanding o selected reminiscences compel him to redeploy the sequences, and how it is not simply this or that speci whole of his life which now appears to him in a new knowledge is synthetic in the Kantian sense because i with the establishment of a model of understanding, n ance of a series of propositions binding on the sub (which eventually leads to a reductive biography of t Cardinal Newman). It is committed to modifying the subject to the content of his life. Thus the narrator Things Past, on hearing the truth about Albertine's l suddenly reminisces about the sadistic scene he has w jouvain, and this reminiscence in turn forces him perception of the incident. Yet more important than which would allow him to quickly redistribute his fe to occupy the place of the voyeur, he discovers that along.
Memory, then, retrieves the past as an eternity which transcends the specificity of the event. No wonder that from Plato to Augustine to Proust, to know is essentially to remember truths temporarily obfuscated in the prevailing cultural tradition. However, my point is not to suggest a Platonic theory of autobiography. Rather, I am interested in autobiography's prescription of an ongoing present of the mind.
It is no accident that most histories of autobiography begin with an examination of Augustine's Confessions, as if the personal history of the Bishop of Hippo marked not only a beginning in a literary genre established in the modern period but a new direction in the long history of the relation between man's individual consciousness and the forms of his culture. There the critic discovers the role of memory in this relation and the fashioning of personal identity. He also detects the beginning of a metacritical reflection by the subject on the functioning of his and all memory. By the same token, he finds that the unity of the autobiographer's subjective experience is contingent upon the establishment of memory as a repository of universal figures and tropes, referring all individual experience to a continuing process of cultural self-preservation which runs from Quintilian's reflection on strategies of discourse to Montaigne's array of citational devices. Finally, but this point is only a corollary of the preceding ones, he realizes that the mere sugges- 29 Remember Balzac's contention that he was competing wit any other. A metonymical approach to the past is n porary aid in the constitution of a fictional universe in that an elaborate description in a novel by Balzac o viewed as providing the proper context for the unfoldi It is not designed to bolster the representation of reali artful substitute for the systems already governing ou social reality (schools, books, museums, archives). I allow the functioning of a system which produces an and an imaginary topography by integrating the tim the time it takes him to describe himself-with the memory. The time of the subject writing and rerea become an integral part of the memory's production the explanatory principle (a particular vision of the subsystem of another, etc.) which every autobiograp own writing is now a part of the writing itself. The ti through the explanation, to move from one fragment explanation. Remembering and writing one's memories autobiography lead to the establishment of a world contiguous, metonymical relation to one's own life: " ing to find a solution in my imagination, which produc of pictures of ready-made shapes, shuffling and rearran Instead I turned my attention to material things and lo into the question of their mutability, that is the mean cease to be what they have been and begin to be wh been."30 It must be noted, however, that the incorporat experience into the process of his own writing does no narrative derives its authority from the presentation o ences. If such were the case, autobiography could only macy of the memoir. Paradoxically, one of the outc biographical experience is the production of a syst producer has achieved the tour de force of making the system contingent upon the development of his se complete with the doubt and forgetfulness it entails to make an acceptable vision of the world coincide requirements of his own imagination while, at the sam his own person as an exemplum, i.e., the product of unique events which shaped his individual personalit ciled with the recognizable general laws which make th of that personality possible.
In an article on Proust's metonymies reprinted of Proust's ongoing metaphorical process is actu severance with which the narrator searches for his past and allows the process of his reminiscing t time it takes him to progress from one fragmen moving from one space of memory into another.31 of a train ride through wheat fields leads to an enc and produces a vision of its spire covered with w soon to be transformed into a fantasy of fish s proaches a Norman sea resort. The whole pastor "marinized" due to the proximity of the sea. G study by suggesting that the narrator's metony sponsible for the full development of metaphor rative. In contradistinction to the memory of his m freezes Combray in a metaphor of symbiosis and th from seeking to retrieve any information not dire primal need underlying his remembrance, the reve Discourse32) seems to indicate that the production of h has now become a structural activity in its own right.
continue to provide mimetic models for the descrip the culture, e.g., the French or the American Revo become a metacritical activity in which the historian is as the data he collects.
In the end, however, autobiography is not a speech act (parole). It functions as language (langue) although deriving its rules from the exercise of parole. What are these rules ?
The first rule is that all autobiographical exercises must be circular. In structural terms, the work of reminiscing must be absolutely clear in the product of the reminiscing process. However, projected on the plane of a chronological succession, the autobiographical project The third rule is that the reader is to be considered a reference or a judge, as the confessional traditio Montaigne's books, Augustine's God, Proust's Marce are all necessary witnesses of and silent participant rapher's exercise. They are not a part of him. They ar him give substance to this empty space of his.
Although autobiography has always jeopardized th detached, objective Aristotelian mimesis by insertin the image of the writer himself-between the writer a it is only recently that the subversive potential of th enterprise has been perceived. Thus Augustine's C never thought to constitute a departure from the which they originated; they were taken as evidenc and soul-searching in the midst of political decom Abailard's Historia Calamitatum and Rousseau's Co never appeared to serve a radical purpose. It was agree apology was moderately interesting and that the s could be explained in modern terms by the subject's u experiment with his own image-making and to keep fantasy life. Abailard's Historia was considered les of the lover's miseries and of his efforts to right him of the person's ability to respond to change. With however, autobiography was to receive its first disc and Rousseau's negative comments on the Essais on Church's condemnation. This was due to the fact that was the first to resist public pressure. It was a work t to do with established models (the epic, rhetorical sophical treatises, lyric poetry). Indeed, Montaign with taking his distance from all societal models enabl trate on what he saw as his own business: following an self. However, I think that the conventional image staunch individualist recognizing no master is only ma ing because it has now become a cliche through wh critics have helped to undermine the Essais's radical po their recuperation by a bourgeois culture eager to abso to its social and artistic rules. In many respects, th become a model of urbane dissent for the conservative libertarian. Much more interesting is the reality of a Montaigne coming to grips with his cultural heritage. Specifically, his use of impersonal texts to construct topoi, spaces where an individual subject can examine the various social and intellectual roles that his reading of these texts s a radical transformation of memory's function and o the interpersonal, textual forms this memory can ta It was Montaigne who had some of his favorite qu on the ceilings or walls of his library. It was also M fessed to use the Great Masters freely to suit his own expected his readers to do no less with his Essais.
imply a conceptualization of culture as external space can conduct his own self-examination with reference system. While the process includes the private tim writing as an integral part of the growth of self-c volves little reference to the personal history of t It has often been remarked how much we do not learn about Montaigne's chronology by reading the Essais. It is in the great books of his culture that Montaigne seeks the proper locus for his self-examination.
There, outside himself, his whole introspection begins. Very soon, however, the outsider becomes an insider. Pieces of historical knowledge and cultural assumptions easily provide topics-see most of the titles of the Essais-through which the essayist's personal experience becomes topical in its own right. This would confirm Foucault's view of sixteenth-century culture as one of experimentation with analogy and repetition: the way to make a sign signify is to repeat it.33
In other words, a reading of the Essais suggests that any attempt to reminisce in a personal manner automatically becomes part of a larger, impersonal whole. Private memories merge with that segment of culture already intent on remembering itself as culture and asserting its viability as culture by turning concrete historical evidence into knowledge or episteme (e.g., the saga of the Conquistadores becomes reference material for an anthropological critique of both the Old and New Worlds). Autobiographical texts can thus use memory not as a private speech but as a universal language by using as a grille other texts which already constitute the past. The Essais may appear to do this smoothly, unsystematically. But they are a system, nonetheless, if only because of their distribution in various chapters complete with rhetorical titles. They can be and have been taken as a compendium of sentences and arguments in the tradition of Plutarch which, picked up by the Latin rhetors and Quintilian, flourished throughout late Latinity and the various stages of medieval commentary. But they are more than that. With their acceptance of texts as both products and generators of memory, the Essais, to the highest degree, and all other autobiographical 33 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1970; rpt. New York, 1973) , Ch. ii. forms, to some degree, allow us to project human its epistemological processes, into a mental space wh is that it includes representation of the subject s all the steps, meticulously surveying the various this mental space possible.
In this sense, then, the autobiographical work
Joyce cannot be part of a tradition of model-buildi gamut from Plato's Republic, especially the Critias, and English Utopians of the eighteenth and nine cause in the models of that tradition, the philosoph to illustrate his text through a picture of the mind inscribe his own cognitive progress. Those philo tions are rather similar to the kind used in the scie any trace of the modelizing subject. Instead, auto a tradition which runs from the Odyssey to the Comedy, where the poet includes himself in the work-his cosmogony-and lives the heroic dream of a world which remains separate from him, yet w by making himself an integral part of its descripti tion of Hell is the full account of a journey to the the guidance of the same poet who had already mentor. In the Odyssey, the recitation of the ba Odysseus to recognize himself as the hero of th Both the Odyssey and the Aeneid on the one h Comedy on the other, feature explorations of mem writer to construct his epic as if the universality o be guaranteed by a contact with the past. Thus O ing his stay with Calypso when he catches himself thus he escapes the Lotus Eaters whose purpose is to thus he also visits the dead in Hades. The visit to especially significant in that it suggests a basic mod of meaning through a fictional representation of t ory. In this case the representation, which is bu exactly are the ghosts like in Hades? they live y they cannot be touched lest they dissolve), is not ju progress of the narrative; it is also the condition f of that progress. By reading or listening to the Od other lands, other people, other cultures. We also le a part of what we learn, as this knowledge enters ou us a part of memorable texts. Finally, by allowing abolishes the distance, the difference mandating solely the explanation of past events but any exp standing at all, is basically a replay of the process b
